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THE INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATE DISTRIBUTIONS-
A NEED FOR REFORM
HERMAN L. TRAUTMANt
INTRODUCTION
In few areas of tax law are the rewards for careful tax planning more
dramatic than those which can be achieved in arranging the distributions
of a decedent's estate. The fiduciary may select any fiscal year; he may
split the estate's taxable income between the estate and its beneficiaries by
making appropriate distributions; and in a proper case he can create ad-
ditional taxpayers by making partial distributions of the estate's corpus
items to the marital deduction trust, the non-marital deduction trust, and
other residuary trusts.
In few other areas are there so many horrible tax traps, however.
Most lawyers become calloused to the complexities of the tax statutes and
the twists and turns of legislative policy, administrative interpretation, and
judicial tinkering. When he surveys the various tax options available to
the fiduciary of a decedent's estate, however, the most hardened practi-
tioner must steel himself for the remarkably intricate interplay of state
probate law and federal tax statutes.1
I confess to a very genuine desire to improve the law concerning the
income taxation of decedents' estates. I believe that estate income ought
to be treated differently and separately from the income taxation of trusts,
and I hope very much for the day when simplicity will again become a
predominant value, particularly, at least, for the smaller estates.
Having made this confession, I propose to discuss below the im-
portant problem areas concerning the income taxation of estate distribu-
tions, to show how wise and sophisticated estate planning and fiduciary
administration can indeed manage them; I will also point out the import-
ant traps for the unwary; and then I would like to return to my first love,
which, as indicated, is to seek to improve the law concerning the income
taxation of decedents' estates. In this latter role I shall present a survey
tProfessor of Law, Vanderbilt University. This article is a revision of a paper
presented by the author at the Third Annual Institute on Estate Planning sponsored by
the University of Miami and its Institute of Estate Planning at the Hotel Americana,
Bal Harbour (Miami Beach), Florida on Jan. 10, 1969. See 3 INsTrT ON ESTATE
PLANNING, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAwv CENTER (1969), to be published by New Kirk
Associates, Inc.
1. Compare Soil, Tax Elections of a Decedent's Estate, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
SECOND INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 68.800 (1968).
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of the suggested alternatives for taxing the income of decedents' estates,
some of which just might be the law of tomorrow.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
From the very outset of our tax history the income of estates has
been taxed under the same rules applicable to trusts. The Revenue Act of
1916 contained the essential idea that fiduciaries should be taxed as in-
dividuals except on the amounts distributed to beneficiaries.2 The idea
was reinforced in the Revenue Act of 19183 and continued on to become
firmly established in the 1939 Code.' Please note, however, that this
original scheme for taxing the income of estates and trusts permitted the
executor and the trustee to determine the income tax consequences of dis-
tributions to beneficiaries by designating the source of each distribution as
either income or corpus. When to this was added the 1954 Code policy
decision that all distributions, whether out of corpus or income, should be
taxable income to the recipient beneficiaries to the extent of distributable
net income, there developed a fundamental and an important need to
provide a separate scheme for the income taxation of decedents' estates.
This need is fundamental because the very purpose of estate administration
is to settle the affairs of a deceased person, to pay his debts and taxes, and
to distribute as quickly as possible the net assets to his beneficiaries, who
are often his immediate family. Such is not the usual case with a trust
where the purpose is primarily to create a continuing management ar-
rangement to last for several years, oftentimes for lives in being plus the
minority of children. Early distribution of corpus assets is not a typical
purpose of the trust management arrangement. This fundamental dif-
ference between estates and trusts was not recognized, however, in the
haste of compiling the 1954 Code.5 The result is a kind of chaos and dis-
tortion in which a particular distribution of estate assets is regarded as an
obvious corpus distribution for the purposes of state probate law, a federal
2. Revenue Act of 1916, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (1916). See Sugarman,
Estates and Trusts, 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1749, 1750 (House Committee on
Ways and Means 1959); Fillman, Selections From Subchapter J, 10 TAX. L. REV.
453, 454 n.8 (1955).
3. Revenue Act of 1918, § 219, 40 Stat. 1057, 1071 (1919).
4. Fillman, note 2 supra.
5. The draft statute prepared by the American Law Institute in its income tax
project, which was often used as a reference work in the compilation of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, provided that decedents' estates should be taxed under the
"entity" rule for a fixed period of time (fifty-one months was suggested), permitting
any estate to elect, however, to be taxed as a trust. During the period the estate
would be taxed as an individual; no tax deduction would be permitted the estate for
distributions to beneficiaries, and such distributions would be tax-free to the recipients.
See 2 ALI FED. INcomE TAX STAT. §§ 147-48 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
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income tax deduction to the distributing estate,' and as federal gross in-
come tax deduction to the distributing estate,' and as federal gross income
to the estate beneficiaries under section 662. This remarkable interplay
of state probate law and federal tax law in the treatment of estate dis-
tributions in a baffling puzzle, not just to the country lawyer and the
general practitioner, but indeed to some Wall Street tax lawyers educated
under the 1939 Code and perhaps to the authors of some existing Treasury
Regulations.7
No doubt you have noticed in recent months that some Treasury
regulations have been judicially declared to be invalid with respect to
estate distributions.' I predict there will be more of this with respect to
estate distributions, and I shall discuss one important regulation which
seems to me to be ready for a similar judgment.' These developments
are simply a reflection of the completely separate policy values of Sub-
chapter J and their ineptness in the context of decedent estate distributions.
II. THE POLICY VALUES OF SUBCHAPTER J
What precisely are the policy values of Subchapter J? It is believed
that there are two separate policies as indicated below.
A. The Gift Exclusion from Gross Income Policy
Section 102 (a) provides that gross income does not include the value
of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. This has
always been the Congressional policy since the Revenue Act of 1913.1"
In Irwin v. Gavit,"1 however, the taxpayer received a testamentary gift of
a part of the income of a trust for a period which could not exceed fifteen
6. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 661 [hereinafter citations to sections refer to the
1954 Code unless otherwise indicated].
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(e) (1956) states that amounts paid by a decedent's
estate pursuant to a court order under state probate law for the support of the widow
or other dependent during the administration of the estate is not deductible by the estate
and taxable to the recipients under the conduit system of Subchapter J when the source
of payment is estate corpus; only when amounts are to be charged to estate income
would the regulations apply the deduction-inclusion system. The regulation was
recently held invalid in Estate of McCoy, 50 T.C. 562 (1968). The court reasoned that
the source of distribution was an important consideration under the 1939 Code, but not
under sections 661 and 662 of the 1954 Code.
8. Hay v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Tex. 1967) holding invalid the,
Treas. Reg. § 1.662(c)-i (1956) which interprets the word "during" in section 662(c)
to read "for any taxable year . . . of the estate. . . ending with or within his taxable'
year." See also Estate of McCoy, 50 T.C. 562 (1968) holding invalid Treas. Reg.
§ 1.661(a) -2(e) (1956) as indicated in note 7, supra.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-i(b) (1956) insofar as it is applied to the satisfaction
of a pecuniary formula marital deduction gift.
10. Del ,Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The Constitutional Problem of,
Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income, 23 TAx L. Rzv. 231, 232 (1968).
11. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
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years. The courts below had held that the income payments to the tax-
payer were property acquired by bequest and were therefore not gross in-
come subject to tax. The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion
which drew a distinction between a gift of corpus and a gift of income,
holding that the latter is taxable and not within the gift exclusion policy.
Section 102(b) is thus a statutory codification of the rule of Irwin v.
Gavit.
It seems appropriate to emphasize that Subchapter J of the 1954
Code, like its predecessors, is first, and perhaps primarily, an implementa-
tion of the policy to exclude gifts of corpus from gross income and an em-
bodiment of the doctrine of Irwin v. Gavit in the factual context of estates
and trusts.
No doubt this policy was more clearly apparent in the 1939 Code
and its predecessor revenue acts under which a fiduciary was allowed to
label distributions as either corpus or income. The policy is still, how-
ever, an important part of the 1954 Code and, as such, the idea that dis-
tributions of corpus should be excluded from gross income while distribu-
tions of income should be included in gross income should be brought
forth into sharper focus. I submit that keeping in mind this original
policy of the statutory scheme will serve one well in helping to evaluate
some of the razzle-dazzle and confusion encountered in this area of the law.
B. The 1954 Policy to Deny the Fiduciary the Power to Determine
the Sources of Estate Distributions for Income Taxc Purposes
In 1954 a second policy value was added to the statutory scheme; it
is completely separate and perhaps foreign to the mores of estates and
trusts, which have traditionally distinguished between the corpus account
and the income account. The new policy was based upon an analogy to
section 316 in the corporate context. This was the idea that fiduciaries
ought not to be allowed to determine for federal income tax purposes
whether it is corpus or income that is being distributed, because to do so
is to determine the income tax consequences to the beneficiaries under the
gift exclusion policy. Instead, under the 1954 Code all distributions by
estates and trusts, whether out of corpus or income, are taxable to the
beneficiaries to the extent of distributable net income. Section 661 (a)
accordingly provides for a distribution deduction to the estate or trust not
only for income distributed but also for "any other amounts properly
paid" to beneficiaries, a phrase which is construed to be broad enough to
cover corpus distributions.
The tax deduction of section 661 (a) is limited to the "distributable
net income" of the estate, a chameleon-like concept which, as Fillman
suggested, changes color almost every time "it is obliged to perform some
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duty. '12 Nevertheless, it is the key concept of Subchapter J with respect
to those trusts and estates which are recognized as valid tax entities,
serving several very different purposes, e.g.: (1) to provide a maximum
measuring rod for determining the extent to which distributions to bene-
ficiaries will be deductible to the estate or trust under section 661 (a), and
taxable to the beneficiaries under section 662(a) ; (2) to compute the net
component elements of distributable net income with respect to dividends,
tax exempt interest, rent, etc., so that the amount each beneficiary receives
shall be treated as having the same tax character in his hands as in the
hands of the fiduciary; and (3) to avoid the tracing power of the fidu-
ciary to determine the source of distributions as between corpus and
income.
It thus appears that there are two completely separate policy values in
Subparts A, B and C of Subchapter J. They are (1) to provide the tra-
ditional gift exclusion from gross income policy in the context of estates
and trusts, and (2) to deny the fiduciary the power to determine the
source of distributions to beneficiaries to the extent of distributable net
income. These are applied substantially alike to both decedents' estates
and trusts. _
III. THE REMARKABLE INTERPLAY OF STATE PROBATE LAW AND
FEDERAL TAX LAW WITH RESPECT TO ESTATE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. The Statutory Trap for Decedents" Estates
As indicated in the introductory discussion, when the second policy
value was added by the 1954 Code, an important need arose for a separate
scheme of income taxation for decedents' estates. The reason this is true
is that in decedents' estates, differently from trusts, executors are supposed
to make, and should be encouraged to make, early distributions of those
corpus assets of the estate which are no longer needed for the administra-
tion of the estate. Among the members of a family group some assets
need to be distributed to certain individuals sooner than others. The
family car and tangible personal property to the widow, close corporation
stock to a son, farm equipment and live stock to another are well-known
examples of obvious corpus distributions which executors are encouraged
to make early in the estate administration. .Yet it is precisely here where
one of the most frequent of the several, horrid tax-traps exists for the
unwary with respect to estate distributions; the residuary beneficiary who
receives an early distribution of these corpus assets for the maintenance of
the decedent's home, the operation of his farm, or the continuance of his
business will be liable for an income tax to the extent of the estate's dis-
12. Fillman, supra note 2, at 485.
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tributable net income because of the second policy value added by the
1954 Code. The chances are quite likely that he will be burdened with a
disproportionately large share of the tax. For example, if an executor
should have 15,000 dollars of distributable net income in his first taxable
year, a distribution to the widow, as a residuary beneficiary, of the family
car and the farm equipment will carry to her the income tax liability for
the 15,000 dollars of probate income held by the executor.
B. How Do Smart People Avoid This Problem?
This common tax trap for the many, the good, but the unwary can
be easily avoided by the smart and knowledgeable, either before death by
good estate planning for the testator, or after death by capable, alert fidu-
ciary administration.
1. Estate Planning: Section 663 (a) provides for certain exclusions
from the conduit system of Subchapter J. Of primary importance here
is an exclusion for any gift or bequest of a specific sum or a specific pro-
perty which is paid all at once or in not more than three installments, pro-
vided it is not a gift which can be paid only from income. Here again we
see an example of the basic policy of Subchapter J drawing the traditional
distinction between a gift of corpus and a gift of income, but limiting even
the former to gifts of a "specific sum" or a "specific property."
Wise estate planning for the testator will dictate a separate testa-
mentary provision for gifts of specific sums of money and specific items
of property to the surviving spouse and other members of the immediate
family even if they are also the residuary beneficiaries of his estate. Dur-
ing the executorial period a family needs enough money to live on, a house,
furniture and contents, the family car or cars, farm equipment and other
items they have been accustomed to living with. Many, if not all of these,
may well be the subject matter of specific legacies in the testator's will,
and thus avoid the unfortunate application of the Subchapter J conduit
system to their early distribution.
2. Fiduciary Administration: If the decedent's will was not well
planned in this respect so that there are no specific legacies to his nearest
and dearest residuary beneficiaries, an alert fiduciary can still save the
day. The estate is a new taxpayer and as such it may choose any annual
accounting period ending on the last day of any month without obtaining
the prior approval of the Internal Revenue Service." By choosing a short
fiscal year in which there is little or no distributable net income as yet
received by the executor, early distribution of the family car, furniture,
farm equipment and other needed items of estate assets can be effectuated
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1(b) (3) (1957).
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without income tax consequences. For example, if a decedent dies on
April 10, the executor can choose a fiscal year ending on April 30, which
will probably be prior to the receipt of very much taxable income by the
executor; during this short fiscal year the needed corpus items can be
distributed to the family without substantial income tax consequences.
C. Post-Mortem Tax Planning by the Sophisticated Fiduciary
As indicated, sections 661 and 662, the estate deduction-beneficiary
inclusion sections, can be a trap for the unwary in the settlement of a de-
cedent's estate. But they can also be the vehicle for substantial tax bene-
fits in the hands of the alert, knowledgeable executor. In this section we
will consider the important traps to be avoided and the important benefits
to be gained by good fiduciary administration. Before taking these up
under separate headings, however, the following ground rules for
decedents' estates should be kept clearly in mind. First, the separate
share rule of section 663(c) applies only to trusts; it does not
apply to decedents' estates. Second, estate distributions are gen-
erally tier two distributions because they are made at the discretion of the
executor. The typical estate is thus taxed as if it were a single entity with
multiple beneficiaries of the same class. Third, section 663 provides an
exception to the deduction inclusion sections for gifts of a specific sum of
money or of specific property. Fourth, these rules can obviously have no
application to assets which are not part of the probate estate, such as life
insurance and real property passing directly to the devisees under local law.
1. Avoid Disproportionate Distributions: Attention has been
called to the typical trap where one of several residuary beneficiaries needs
an early distribution of estate assets while the others do not. Where the
estate has distributable net income, the recipient beneficiary will experience
a disproportionate burden for the income tax on the estate's distributable
net income. This can be avoided or ameliorated in a proper case by
equalizing estate distributions among the several beneficiaries of an estate
so that the income tax burden is spread evenly among them.
2. Non-Liquid Distributions: Suppose the executor had received
dividend income in the amount of 20,000 dollars. He later distributes
close corporation stock to Son, a residuary beneficiary, having a value of
100,000 dollars. No other distributions were made during the year. The
estate is entitled to a distribution deduction under section 661 in the
amount of 20,000 dollars and Son must include this 20,000 dollars in his
gross income, even though he has not received one dollar of cash. An
alert and thoughtful executor would consider also the need to distribute
enough cash to pay the tax on the estate distribution in kind.
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3. Tax-Free Basis Adjustment: Treasury Regulation 1.661 (a)-2 (f)
provides that where property is distributed in kind, the basis of the prop-
erty in the hands of the beneficiary is the fair market value at the time of
distribution to the extent that this value is included in the gross income of
the beneficiary. The regulation explains the adjustments to basis among
several items distributed in kind and where the value thereof exceeds the
amount included in the gross income of the beneficiary, and Revenue Rul-
ing 64-314" elaborates instructively upon the regulation.
The following will illustrate how the regulation may be used advan-
tageously by an executor: The Smith Estate has dividend income of
30,000 dollars and no expenses. The two beneficiaries feel the need for
a distribution and the executor decides to make distributions of 15,000
dollars to each A and B. The executor has Stock X in his portfolio which
has a fair market value of 30,000 dollars and a basis of 10,000 dollars to
the estate. Thus the executor has a choice between distributing 30,000
dollars in cash from the income account, or distributing Stock X from the
corpus account. The estate will receive a distribution deduction of 30,000
dollars under section 661 in either event, and the beneficiaries will be tax-
able under section 662 on a total of 30,000 dollars in either event. By
distributing Stock X to A and B, the beneficiaries are entitled to increase
their basis for it to 30,000 dollars so that their sale of it will result in no
gain to them. The executor can retain the 30,000 dollars in cash which
he may invest in new securities having a basis of that amount. By dis-
tributing the stock instead of the cash the executor has saved the capital
gains tax on 20,000 dollars of profit on the stock, and can up-grade his
investment portfolio.
It should be understood that the holding period of A and B in the
above example would presumably begin on the date of distribution to them
since their basis is not determined by reference to the transferor's basis-
i.e., the estate's. Also, it is imperative that the executor realize that these
basis provisions can be detrimental as well as beneficial. Suppose the ex-
ecutor should distribute stock to A and B with a basis of 30,000 dollars
and a fair market value of 10,000 dollars? The latter figure would be the
distribution deduction to the estate, the inclusion by the beneficiaries, and
the basis for the stock in their hands. In this instance, the executor
should have sold the stock first and distributed the cash.
4. Distributions of the Right to Receive Section 691 Items: Sup-
pose an executor with 30,000 dollars of distributable net income should
distribute to A and B, residuary beneficiaries, the right to income in re-
spect of a decedent to the extent of 30,000 dollars. Bear in mind that the
14. 1964-2 Cug. BULL. 167,
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predecessor of section 691 was added to the 1939 Code when the distribu-
tion of such a corpus item did not have Subchapter J conduit consequences.
Now that it does, a distribution of the right to receive income in respect
of a decedent would appear to give the executor a deduction under section
661 for its value as well as the right to exclude the income when later
received by the distributees. On the other hand, the recipients, A and B,
seem to be taxed twice, once on the receipt of the right to the extent of
the estate's distributable net income under section 662, and again on the
collection of the income item under section 691. While section 1014(c)
prohibits a step-up in basis for income in respect of a decedent, the first
sentence of Treasury Regulation 1.661 (a)-2 (f) (3) states that the recipi-
ent of distributed property obtains a basis for it to the extent that its value
is included in the gross income of the beneficiary. If the latter applies to
an estate distribution of the right to receive income in respect of a de-
cedent, there should be very little if any tax when the item is collected.
There seems to be no litigation or administrative determination involving
the application of Treasury Regulation 1.661 (a)-2 (f) (3) to a distribu-
tion of a section 691 item.
5. The Use of Testamentary Trusts As Income Taxpayers: The
term "beneficiary" as used in the Code and regulations includes a trust
created by the decedent's will.15 This definition permits, in many cases,
the creation of one or more additional income taxpayers provided the gifts
to the trusts are not of a specific property or a specific sum of money.
To illustrate the tax management opportunities, assume that the
estate has distributable net income of 40,000 dollars, and that the de-
cedent's will creates a marital deduction trust for W and a non-marital
deduction residuary trust in which the trustee has discretion to accumulate
income or pay income and corpus among the family group, which includes
W, during the life of W. It is possible for the executor to distribute
10,000 dollars of corpus assets as a partial funding to each of the two
trusts, and pay 10,000 dollars of estate income directly to W from estate
income. The estate will receive a distribution deduction of 30,000 dollars
under section 661 and pay a tax on the remaining 10,000 dollars of dis-
tributable net income. Each of the two trusts will show the receipt of
10,000 dollars of distributable net income for federal tax purposes, but
when measured by state probate law, each trust has received corpus assets
which cannot be distributed as trust income. Each trust will pay the tax
on its distributable net income, presumably from corpus cash. It is said
that most corporate fiduciaries have adopted the practice of charging the
tax paid to the income account so that the corpus account can be reim-
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-1 (1956).
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bursed when the executor ultimately distributes accumulated probate in-
come upon termination of the estate.16 For purposes of probate account-
ing for income the executor may prefer to distribute 10,000 dollars of
corpus assets and 5,000 dollars of estate income to each trust, and allow
each trust to distribute 5,000 dollars to W. The result is the same:
the 40,000 dollars of estate income has been split four ways at an income
tax savings of 8,020 dollars (the difference between 16,322 dollars and
8,302 dollars) and half of it represents the partial funding of the two testa-
mentary trusts with corpus assets. This can be repeated annually while
the estate is in administration.
The technique of splitting estate income taxes by making partial
funding distributions to testamentary trusts of assets which under state
trust law are corpus assets has many possible advantages. An estate
with 50,000 dollars of taxable income may distribute 25,000 dollars of
corpus assets to a residuary trust distributing assets with a basis to the
estate of 20,000 dollars and a fair market value of 25,000 dollars. The
estate will receive a distribution deduction of 25,000 dollars; the trust will
include 25,000 dollars in its taxable income and receive a stepped-up basis
for the assets distributed; the income beneficiaries will include no income
in their returns. The income tax savings is some 5,620 dollars plus the
step-up in the basis of 5,000 dollars on the assets distributed to the trust.
A word of caution is in order. While the throwback rules17 do not
apply to decedents' estates, they do apply to the trusts used as additional
income taxpayers. Each trust receiving a partial funding will have "un-
distributed net income" for the year. The trustee having the power to
invade corpus should be alert in the exercise of the power during the
five-year period next succeeding the taxable year in which the trust re-
ceived the principal distribution. Such invasions may be considered ac-
cumulation distributions under section 666, taxable to the recipient as if
received on the last day of each of the five preceding years. The excep-
tions to the throwback rules in section 665 (b) then become the important
area of tax management in this respect.
6. Funding a Charitable Remainder Trust-How to Save Big
Money for the Income Beneficiaries of a Substantial Estate: The executor
of a decedent's estate has a tremendous opportunity to save money for the
taxable income beneficiaries of a charitable remainder trust, and perhaps
a tremendous surcharge liability if he neglects to take advantage of it.
16. Covey, The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Revocable Trust in Estate
Planning, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1379, 1394 n.44 (1968) ; Parr, Distributions
By Estates, A Review of the Tax Consequences, 107 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 97, 98 n.9
(1968).
17. §§ 665-69.
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Assume an estate with 3 million dollars worth of securities producing
150,000 dollars in estate income annually. The decedent's will bequeathes
his entire estate in trust to pay the income to A, B and C in equal shares
for their lives and upon the death of the survivor, remainder to charity.
The executor can distribute 150,000 dollars per year in corpus assets as
a partial funding of the trust, thereby receiving a distribution deduction
for that amount under section 661, and have a zero taxable income. -The
trust will have 150,000 dollars of gross income under section 662, but
because the distribution consists of corpus assets under state trust law, the
trust must hold these assets as corpus, and would be prohibited under
state law from distributing the assets to the income beneficiaries. Since
the corpus assets are held for the charitable remainder beneficiary, the
trust is entitled to a charitable deduction under section 642(c) for an
amount of the gross income, without limitation, which is permanently set
aside for a charitable purpose. 8 The result is that the executor can avoid
paying any income tax at all during the entire period of estate administra-
tion by making corpus distributions to the trust equal to the estate's dis-
tributable net income. Upon termination of the estate, the accumulated
income can be distributed to A, B and C tax free, except to the extent of
the last year's current income, which is likely to be very little if a short
fiscal year of termination is used.
In the case of United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n,"0 the Government argued that because the corpus distribution is
gross income to the trust for purposes of the federal income tax under
section 662, it must be treated as income distributable by the executor to
the income beneficiaries, and since it was not distributed to them, it is
taxable in the hands of the trustee. In rejecting the Government's position
the court said:
The recipient is required, by the same sections [§§ 661 and
662], to include in its gross income the amount of the income
deemed distributed. These sections, however, do not take the
additional step which the Government asks this court to take.
They do not purport to change the rule that the disposition of
the income deemed to have been received by the distributee, here
the trust, is governed by local law, and the Code makes clear that
tax consequences attach according to the actual disposition of
that income pursuant to local law. Here, it was -required by
local law to be treated as and held as corpus, for charitable pur-
18. United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1963).
19. Id.
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poses. It was thus permanently set aside for charitable purposes
within the meaning of section 642.20
The decision seems irrefutable under the existing Code. It seems per-
fectly clear that local law controls the determination of what constitutes
"income" for purposes of distribution and when it is distributable.21 Here
the local probate court had already designated the distribution as corpus,
and the trustee could not have treated it as trust income and paid it out to
the individual beneficiaries without violating the mandate of that court.
The principle here is the same as in the previous sub-section where corpus
distributions are made to testamentary trusts for the purpose of splitting
the estate income. The only difference is that instead of converting local
law corpus into taxable income for the purpose of splitting it among mul-
tiple beneficiaries, the purpose in Bank of America is to convert local law
corpus into gross income for the purpose of qualifying it for the charitable
deduction allowed to estates and trusts under section 642(c)." Both of
these incongruous results flow naturally from the 1954 policy decision
that all distributions, whether out of corpus or income, should be taxable
income to the recipient beneficiaries to the extent of the estate's distribut-
able net income.
7. Selecting Fiscal Years and Planning for the Termination of an
Estate: Reference has been made above to the executor's ability to choose
a short fiscal year at the beginning of administration when little or no
distributable net income has as yet been received, during which the distri-
bution of needed assets can be made to residuary beneficiaries without in-
come tax consequences. It was there pointed out that the estate, being a
new taxpayer, may select any fiscal year the fiduciary wishes. The fiscal
year chosen must not be longer than twelve months and must end on the
last day of the month.2"
The short fiscal year may be used advantageously to obtain the bene-
fits of an additional taxable period and exemption off the front end of the
estate's executorial period. A second taxable period and exemption de-
duction can be accomplished off the tail end of the estate's executorial
period when final distribution of estate assets and the payment of ter-
mination expenses are made immediately after the close of a regular fiscal
year, so that the year of final termination is a short taxable year. Thus,
the management of the estate's fiscal years and planning for the termina-
20. Id., at 54.
21. § 643(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a) (1956); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 345 (1954).
22. Somers, Estate Corpus Distribution is Converted into Charitable Income Tax
Deduction, 20. J. oF TAX. 228-29 (1964).
23. § 441(d) & (e).
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tion of the estate's administration becomes an important and perhaps
crucial responsibility for the executor; the possibilities for tax benefits are
so substantial that there may be a correlative surcharge for failure to
take advantage of them.
In the first fifteen months of a large estate's adminstration, before
payment of the federal estate tax, the estate will probably receive more
income than thereafter. A fiscal year of seven or eight months may well
contain as much taxable income as the second full twelve months year.
If the tax plan contemplates that the estate will accumulate the income
annually during administration, the short fiscal year technique is an im-
portant management tool indeed.
Selection of a January 31 fiscal year for marital and residuary trusts
will provide the income beneficiaries almost a full year of deferment of the
time in which to pay tax on the trust income. Some individuals, however,
may dislike being a year behind in paying their taxes. Also, the Govern-
ment catches up in the year of the beneficiary's death when, according to
the regulations, there must be included in the decedent's final return his
share of the trust's income for the full year ending January 31, and in
addition, his share of the trust's income for the current year that has been
paid to him. 4
Planning for the termination of an estate should include careful con-
sideration of the income tax consequences under sections 661 and 662.
Since these sections are blind to the differences between corpus and in-
come, when termination distributions are made to estate beneficiaries, ad-
justments are often required under state law between income and corpus
beneficiaries with respect to income tax liabilities. 5 To reduce these ad-
justments to the minimum, and to obviate the technical necessity for mak-
ing the mandatory basis adjustments required by Treasury Regulation
1.661 (a)-2 (f) when the value of property distributed in kind is included
in the beneficiary's gross income, the final distribution of the estate should
be planned to occur as soon after the close of the estate's fiscal year as pos-
sible. This will reduce, or eliminate entirely, taxable income of the estate
for the year of final distribution.
A new development in the 1954 Code is section 642 (h) which makes
available for the first time excess deductions and unused net operating
and capital loss carry-overs to the "beneficiaries succeeding to the estate
or trust." Termination expenses may well be paid right after the close
* of the estate's fiscal year so that the excess deductions can be passed
through to the beneficiaries, who may need to plan accordingly to acceler-
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.652(c)-2 (1956).
25. See, e.g., note 16 supra.
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ate income, realize gains or postpone the making of deductible payments
in order to avoid the loss of the estate's excess deductions.
IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS OF CURRENT INTEREST IN SUBCHAPTER J
A. Is a Pecuniary Formula Marital Deduction Gift a Specific Sum
Excluded from the Conduit of Subchapter J?
Section 663 (a) (1) excludes from the conduit system of Subchapter
J gifts of a "specific sum of money" and a "specific property." Treasury
Regulation 1.663 (a) -1 (b) (1) undertakes to define these quoted phrases
of the statute. After stating that bequests to his son of a decedent's part-
nership interest and to his daughter of a sum of money equal in value to
the decedent's partnership interest do qualify for the exclusion, the regu-
lation takes the position that distributions in satisfaction of pecuniary and
fractional share formula marital deduction gifts do not qualify for the
exclusion, either as a gift of "a specific sum of money or of specific prop-
erty." The reasons given in the regulation are as follows:
The identity of the property and the amount of money specified
in the preceding sentence are dependent both on the exercise of
the executor's discretion and on the payment of administration
expenses and other charges, neither of which are facts existing
on the date of the decedent's death. It is immaterial that the
value of the bequest is determinable after the decedent's death
before the bequest is satisfied (so that gain or loss may be
realized by the estate in the transfer of property in satisfaction
of it).26
There is a wide-spread feeling among knowledgeable tax lawyers that
the regulation is not a valid interpretation of section 663 (a) (1), and this
is particularly true with respect to the pecuniary formula gift. One hears
increasingly of reports that the regulation is not being obeyed and that the
recipients of such formula marital deduction gifts are not being advised
that the payment of the bequest carries with it a share of the estate's dis-
tributable net income.27  Lawyers in nationally known firms have re-
cently experienced the surprise of the double-tax consequence when a pe-
cuniary formula gift is satisfied by a distribution in kind of appreciated
property; the executor has realized a capital gain on the distribution, and
the recipient beneficiary is held to have received income to the extent of
the estate's distributable net income. In a recent case that came to the
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.663 (a)-1 (b) (1) (1956).
27. Zimmerman, The Effect of i-Kind Settlements, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1111, 1118 (1964). One hears other reports of this behavior, indicating that the
feeling is fairly wide spread.
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writer's attention, the estate had no income except for the gain realized
by satisfying a formula marital deduction bequest in kind with property
which had appreciated in value. The discharge of the pecuniary obliga-
tion to the legatee caused a realization of gain to the estate, and the same
discharge of indebtedness was thought to be a distribution to the benefi-
ciary of that capital gain.
You will recall that the cases of Suisman v. Eaton-8 and Kenan v.
Commissioner" held that a legacy of a specific sum of money creates a debt
from the estate to the legatee, and that a transfer of appreciated property
in satisfaction of such a legacy is a "sale or other disposition" in which
the estate realizes income. Thus, if the will makes a gift of 200,000 dol-
lars, a transfer by the executor to the legatee of Xerox stock worth
200,000 dollars at distribution, but having a basis to the executor of
150,000 dollars would result in the realization of 50,000 dollars of capital
gain to the executor. In Revenue Ruling 56-270" it was held that a pe-
cuniary formula marital deduction trust was a gift of a "fixed and definite
dollar amount" so that capital gains were realized by the estate when ap-
preciated property was distributed in kind in satisfaction of the bequest,
citing the cases above." In Revenue Ruling 6o-87" the result reached in
Revenue Ruling 56-270 was affirmed and "clarified." The question
raised again was whether capital gain was realized by the estate as a result
of a transfer of property which had appreciated in value to a marital de-
duction trust, which was construed to be a pecuniary formula gift. It
was again held that the gain was realized because the transfer was a satis-
faction of an obligation of a "fixed and definite dollar amount." The
writers of this ruling felt compelled, however, to compare Revenue Ruling
56-270 with Treasury Regulation 1.663(a)-i (b) (1); they argued that
the ruling is not concerned with a specific amount at date of death, but
rather with satisfaction of a fixed amount at date of distribution. Thus,
it was said that the regulation prescribed an entirely different test, and
that the last sentence of the regulation quoted above recognizes that a dif-
ferent rule applies for capital gain purposes, so that the ruling and the
regulations are not considered to be inconsistent.
Does this satisfy you? If a pecuniary formula gift is admittedly a
"specific sum of money" for one purpose, e.g., the realization of capital
gain, is it within the rule of reasonable interpretation to say that the
formula is not a "specific sum of money" under section 663 (a) (1) ? Up-
28. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1936).
29. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
30. 1956-1 Cum. BumL. 325.
31. See cases cited at notes 28 & 29 supra.
32. 1960-1 CmUi. BULL. 286.
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on what basis does the Treasury Regulation add the requirement that the
sum must be specific as of the date of death? The phrases "specific sum
of money" and "specific property" do not in and of themselves seem to
imply the requirement that the sum or the property be ascertainable at the
date of the decedent's death, as distinguished from some later point of time
in the orderly administration of the estate." Instead the central focus in
section 663 (a) (1) is the fundamental distinction between corpus and
income. 4
The "date of death" language is of course well known in the context
of the estate tax marital deduction under section 2056. The Supreme
Court in Jackson v. United States35 relied substantially on the admonition
of the Senate Finance Committee that in considering what is a terminable
interest for the purposes of the estate tax marital deduction "the situation
is viewed as at the date of the decedent's death."3 6  While this language
is a part of the warp and woof of both the policies and rules of the estate
tax marital deduction, it seems improper and unreasonable to inject the
language and its technical requirement as an interpretation of the policies
of Subchapter J and section 663, where the basic policy is to exclude
corpus gifts from gross income. Subchapter J seeks to tax as income only
gifts that can be paid from income; it is not concerned with the
policies or the problems of the estate tax marital deduction. Treasury
Regulation section 1.663(a)-i (b) (1) erroneously confuses the policies
and rules of the estate tax marital deduction with the income tax exclu-
sion provided in section 663 concerning the Subchapter J conduit system.
Further, even within the context of the policies and rules of the estate tax
marital deduction, Revenue Procedure 64-I9"7 is an administrative recog-
nition that the date of death requirement concerning terminability will not
disqualify pecuniary formula gifts as estate tax deductions if their deter-
mination is based upon responsible fiduciary administration which guaran-
tees either ratable sharing or minimum value safeguards.
The Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts, Section of Taxa-
tion, American Bar Association is preparing to ask the Treasury Depart-
ment for an amendment to Treasury Regulation 1.663 (a)-1 (b) (1) with
respect to pecuniary formula marital deduction gifts. In the meantime, it
would seem that the regulation ought to be challenged as an erroneous in-
33. See Note, Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts-Gift of Specific Property,
43 IND. L.J. 791, 795-98 (1968). The author concludes that "[m]athematical precision
at the date of death has no necessary relevance." Id., at 796.
34. -Cf. id., at 805.
35. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
36. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (pt. 2) 10 (1948).
37. 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 682.
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terpretation of section 663(a); the focal point at issue is whether the
date-of-death-requirement is a reasonable interpretation of that Code
section.
The regulation states that bequests to a son of the decedent's in-
terest in a partnership and to his daughter of a sum of money equal to the
value of the partnership are indeed gifts of "specific property" and a "spe-
cific sum of money." Can anyone tell a son or daughter an hour after a
decedent's funeral precisely how much in property or money the decedent's
partnership interest is? Is the orderly liquidation of a partnership after
a partner's death a more responsible fiduciary administration than the
orderly settlement of a decedent's estate under the supervision of a state
court?
B. Other Needed Adjustments to the Existing Code Scheme
Set forth briefly below is a list of suggested technical adjustments to
the existing scheme of the Subchapter J conduit system, the need for
which has either been demonstrated in the cases, or recognized by tax
practitioners. They should be considered as adjustments to the existing
code structure, and distinguished from the alternative schemes for taxing
the income of estates to be discussed in the next section. Some of the ad-
justments listed here will be equally relevant to alternative schemes of
taxation, but not all.
1. Estate of McCoy3" held that a widow's allowance paid pursuant
to a probate court decree and charged to corpus was nevertheless taxable
as income to the extent of the estate's distributable net income. Treasury
Regulation 1.661 (a)-2 (e) was held invalid for providing that such allow-
ances are not taxable under sections 661-662 conduit system "except to
the extent such amounts are payable out of and chargeable to income."
This was a remarkable regulation indeed and, perhaps, a reflection of a
1939 hang-over within the Treasury Department. In promulgating this
regulation, the Treasury Department made an obvious error by applying
a principle of the 1939 Code which is inconsistent with the second policy
decision of the 1954 Code. Nevertheless, the case does demonstrate a
need to expand the current list of exclusions from the Subchapter J con-
duit system of taxation. An exclusion for the family allowance would
be particularly appropriate.
2. Hay v. United States39 held that there is a lack of co-ordination
between sections 661 (a) (2) and 662(a) (2) on the one hand, which ap-
ply the deduction-inclusion conduit to amounts of the distributable net in-
38. 50 T.C. 562 (1968).
39. 263 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
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come paid or credited "for" the taxable year of the estate or discretionary
trust, and section 662(c), on the other hand, which provides that the
amount to be included in the gross income of the beneficiary shall be based
on the distributable net income of the estate or trust paid or credited "dur-
ing" any taxable year or years of the estate or trust ending "within or
with" his taxable year. The court held Treasury Regulation 1.662(c)-1
invalid insofar as it attempts to finesse this lack of coordination by inter-
preting the word "during" in section 662 (c) to mean "for any taxable
year . . . ending with or within" the beneficiary's taxable year.
In the Hay case the taxpayer was the beneficiary of a discretionary
trust which was involved in the management of certain ranching and oil
and gas operations. The trust used the accrual method of accounting and
a fiscal year ending November 30, 1962. Because of the magnitude of
its operations the trust was unable to determine its 1962 net income for
distribution purposes until January 31, 1963. It made a distribution of
10,000 dollars to the taxpayer beneficiary on December 1, 1962, and a
distribution of 56,478.25 dollars on February 1, 1963, both of which rep-
resented trust income for fiscal 1962. The court held that the trust was
entitled to a distribution deduction under section 661 (a) (2) for these two
payments for its fiscal year ending November 30, 1962, because there is
no question that the distributions were "for" that year, and also because
there is no other provision in the 1954 Code relating to deductions taken
by discretionary trusts for distributions to beneficiaries. Continuing, the
court said that the provision found in section 162 (c) of the 1939 Code
restricting the distribution deduction to amounts distributed "during" its
taxable year was not carried over to the 1954 Code. On the other hand,
section 662(c) expressly provides that the beneficiary is to report only
such income as was properly paid "during" the taxable year. Thus, while
the trust was allowed a distribution deduction for fiscal 1962 ending No-
vember 30, 1962, the beneficiaries were taxable in calendar year 1963.
Prior to 1954 the only statute providing for different taxable years
was restricted to simple trusts in which the annual income was required
to be distributed currently to the beneficiary.4" It had no application to
complex trusts and decedents' estates. Section 162(c) of the 1939 Code
provided in a single sentence for both the deduction to the estate or complex
trust and the inclusion by the beneficiary, and both were determined by the
amount of income which was "properly paid or credited during such year
to any . . . beneficiary." It seems clear that the error was inadvertently
made in the haste of compiling the 1954 Code, and that the rules of the
40. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 164, 53 Stat. 67 (1939) (now §§ 652(c) & 662
(c)). See Fillman, supra note 2, at 479.
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1939 Code should be written into the 1954 Code.
3. In re Estate of Nisseni1 held that where the executor made discre-
tionary distributions to the income beneficiaries of two residuary trusts,
the estate was nevertheless entitled to the entire depreciation deduction on
an office building under section 167(h) because the words "heirs, lega-
tees, and devisees" in the last sentence of section 167(h) do not include
individuals who are discretionary income beneficiaries of residual trusts.
Under the 1939 Code it was held that the estate was entitled in all cases
to the full amount of the depreciation deduction. The provisions of sec-
tion 167(h) were first enacted by the 1954 Code in order to prevent the
wasting of the depreciation deduction where the estate or trust income
was exhausted. This seems to be the first case interpreting the portion
of section 167(h) applicable to estates. As indicated by the case, the statute
seems to provide a rule for estates different from that provided for trusts.
The sentence on trusts provides for apportionment of the depreciation de-
duction in accordance with the trust instrument, whereas the sentence on
estates does not. The Nissen case adds the additional difference that in
the case of a trust, where it is not provided otherwise, the depreciation de-
duction is allocated between the trust and the beneficiaries on the basis of
the trust income allocated to each, whereas in the case of an estate there
is the additional requirement that the recipient of estate income must also
qualify under local law as an heir, legatee or devisee. Because they were
only discretionary income beneficiaries of their respective trusts the re-
cipients in Nissen's Estate failed to qualify on the latter point under
North Carolina law.
The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association has recom-
mended that sections 167 and 611 be amended to provide that deprecia-
tion and depletion deductions on property held by an estate be appor-
tioned between the estate and the income beneficiaries in the same manner
as if the property were held in trust.
4. The Separate Share Rule Should be Extended to Estates: There
is general agreement that the separate share rule should be extended to
decedents' estates, and not limited to trusts as is true now under section
663(c). This would reduce somewhat the trap for the unwary when a
distribution of estate assets is made to one of several estate beneficiaries
in a year when the estate has distributable net income.
5. Installment Payments of a Specific Sum or Specific Property:
Both the Advisory Group on Subchapter J and the Ways and Means Com-
mittee in H.R. 9662 agree that the three installment limitation on gifts of
a specific sum and specific property is too narrow. The income tax
41. 345 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1965).
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avoidance feature of installment payments of a specific sum or a specific
property is not in the number of installments, but rather it is in the num-
ber of taxable years in which the installment payments can be made. It
is recommended therefore that section 663 (a) (1) be amended to provide
that gifts of a specific sum of money or specific property which are paid all
at once or in not more than thirty-six calendar months after the date of
the decedent's death should be excluded from the conduit system of Sub-
chapter J.
V. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES FOR THE INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATE
DISTRIBUTIONS-THE NEED FOR REFORM
As indicated in the introductory discussion, when there was added to
the 1954 Code the policy decision that all distributions, whether out of
corpus or income, should be taxable income to the recipients to the extent
of the estate's distributable net income, there came to be an important
need for a separate scheme of income taxation for decedents' estates.
Section 663 (a) (1) excludes from the conduit system of sections 661 (a)
and 662 (a) gifts of a specific sum of money or specific property paid or
credited all at once or in not more than three installments, other than
amounts which can be paid only from income. This exclusion has proved
to be too narrow in scope for the necessary and desirable distributions of
decedents' estates. As examples, section 663 does not exclude from the
rules of sections 661 (a) and 662 (a) distributions of corpus to residuary
legatees, payments solely out of corpus to will contestants, payments out
of corpus to widows for support and family allowance, or payment of in-
testate shares of inheritance. In many instances distributions to a residu-
ary beneficiary in the ordinary course of administration and not prompted
by any tax motive results in the beneficiary being taxed on a dispropor-
tionate share of the estate's income. While extension of the separate
share rule of section 663 (c) to estates will ameliorate the hardship in
some cases, complete relief can be afforded only by designing a separate
scheme for taxing the income of decedents' estates.
Presented below is a survey of the suggested alternatives for taxing
the income of estates and their distributees. In evaluating these proposals
we would do well to remind ourselves that prior to 1954 our basic policy
in this area of tax law was simply to distinguish between gifts of corpus
and gifts of income-the policy of section 102(a) as modified by the doc-
trine of Irwin v. Gavit.42 Do we really need to do anything more than this
for the two to three year period generally needed to administer a de-
cedent's estate? Because the problems of an executor differ from those of
42. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
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a trustee, and because a decedent's estate is not intended to be of long dura-
tion, it is clear that separate consideration needs to be given to estate
distributions.
A. The Advisory Group Report
The Advisory Group on Subchapter J established by the Chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means filed its final report for publication
on December 30, 1958. This was an illustrious group of scholarly and
experienced men, who gave a very great amount of time and hard work
in their efforts to improve Subchapter J. Professor A. James Casner
served as Chairman. With respect to estate distributions, in addition to
extension of the separate share rule to estates as indicated, seven of the
nine members of the Advisory Group recommended that for a period of
thirty-six months following the decedent's death a distribution by an ex-
ecutor should not carry the estate's distributable net income to the dis-
tributee if the distribution is properly charged against corpus and desig-
nated as a distribution of corpus on the books of the estate by the execu-
tor.43 It was recognized that this is a return to the 1939 Code for estate
distributions and that it would give the executor the power to identify and
control the source of the distribution for the three year period involved.
It was believed, however, that the possibility of tax avoidance in this area
for the limited period of time involved is too slight to justify the con-
tinued application of the present arbitrary, inequitable, and complex rules
for attributing estate income to residuary beneficiaries.
It has since been pointed out that under the present rules the executor
controls the income tax consequences of estate distributions by his deci-
sion to distribute or not to distribute a part of the residue. Under the
Advisory Group proposal he determines such consequences by the desig-
nation he gives to the distribution as income or corpus."
As indicated by the earlier discussion in this paper, under the present
inept rules applicable to estates, the sophisticated, professional executor
can split the estate's distributable net income in a typical, proper case be-
tween four taxable entities-the decedent's estate, the marital deduction
trust, the non-marital residuary trust, and the income beneficiary. This
can be accomplished in every year of the executorial period, which might
be many years longer than the three years, or thirty-six months, recom-
mended in the Advisory Group Report. The opportunities for tax avoid-
ance through income splitting during the period of administration are now
43. Final Report From The Advisory Group on Subchapter J. of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, at 31-33 (1958). See Casner, Income Tax Results of Interint
Estate Distributions to Beneficiaries, 98 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 200, 201 (1959).
44. Casner, supra note 43, at 201.
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so attractive that the sophisticate-professional has in many instances be-
come less than enthusiastic about the need for reform. One could con-
ceivably create several residuary trusts to terminate with the end of the
estate administration in order to split the income during the executorial
period. On the other hand, there are countless estates in which there is
either a neglect or an inability to take advantage of the income splitting
permitted by the present rules. There is thus a great lack of uniformity in
the income taxation of decedents' estates with relatively equal income, and
a substantial break-down of the policy value added by the 1954 Code as
applied to decedents' estates.
B. The Entity Rule
The Federal Income Tax Statute prepared by the American Law In-
stitute recog-nized the ineptness of the trust conduit system to decedents'
estates for the period of normal administration. The draft statute on this
income tax project provided that the tax imposed upon individuals shall
apply to estates of deceased persons during the period of the settlement
of the estate. The tax was to be paid by the executor or administrator
and computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual for a
fixed period of time (fifty-one months was suggested, permitting any
estate to elect, however, to be taxed as a trust) .5
This is referred to as the "entity" method of taxing the income of
estates. 4' Two distinguished members of the Advisory Group, Kenneth
W. Bergen and Laurens Williams, favored the adoption of the entity rule
for estates for a period of thirty-six months after the decedent's death plus
the remainder of the taxable year in which the thirty-six month period
expires.4 During this period no deduction would be permitted the estate
for distributions made to beneficiaries, and such distributions would be
tax free to the recipients. After the thirty-six months period the present
trust conduit rules of Subchapter J would be applied for the balance of the
period of estate administration.
If the entity rule is adopted, the only way estate income could be
shifted or spread among the beneficiaries and the estate during the thirty-
six month period would be by the early distribution of corpus assets to the
beneficiaries before taxable income is realized by the estate. This is not
always feasible or practical under either state probate law or federal tax
45. See 2 ALI FED. INCOmE TAX STAT. § 147-48 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
46. See Sugarman, Estates and Trusts, 3 TAX REvIsION COMPENDIUM 1749, 1757
(House Committee on Ways and Means 1959). Cf. Johnson and Vernon, Income of
Estates and Trusts, id., at 1766.
47. Final Report of Advisory Group on Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, at85 (1958).
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law. Thus, the entity rule would subject the beneficiaries of large estates
to a substantial disadvantage to the extent that the estate would be sub-
jected to higher income tax rates than those applicable to the beneficiaries.
The virtue of the entity rule is its relative simplicity. This is an
important value in the current scene of income tax revision in the United
States. An executor would be relieved of the onerous and time consuming
job of planning the income tax consequences to the estate and its benefici-
aries of distributions, or the lack of distributions. The executor is fre-
quently put under pressure by some beneficiaries to make distributions,
and by others to accumulate income. It was suggested that these same
pressures will continue under the recommendation of the majority of the
Advisory Group. Executors of small estates, who are frequently un-
familiar with tax laws, would have far less difficulty with the income tax
return under the entity rule."'
C. The H.R. 9662 Proposal
The Trust and Partnership Income Tax Revision Bill of 1960, known
as H.R. 9662, was introduced by Chairman Wilbur D. Mills and passed
in the House of Representatives and reported to the Senate on June 18,
1960. It was not enacted into law, however.
In addition to extending the separate share rule to decedents' estates
and liberalizing the installment payment of specific gifts as indicated,
H.R. 9662 would have excluded from the conduit system of sections 661
and 662 distributions by the executor of real property, tangible personal
property (other than money) and close corporation stock made within
thirty-six months after the decedent's death. Closely held stock was
limited to stock in a corporation of ten or less stockholders, where twenty
per cent or more in value of the voting stock of the corporation is included
in the decedent's gross estate and the value exceeds either thirty-five per
cent of the gross estate or fifty per cent of the value of his taxable estate.
This latter test is taken from section 6166. It was also proposed that in
the case of an estate in which the value of the gross estate is 100,000 dol-
lars or less the majority proposal of the Advisory Group be adopted, i.e.,
any amount charged to corpus by the executor would be excluded from
the conduit system even though it consisted of cash and marketable se-
curities. The valuation would be determined on the date of death, regard-
less of the valuation date chosen for the estate tax return, and the "gross
estate" for this purpose would be defined as the items included in the gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes less the value of any property in-
48. See the comments of Sugarman, note 46 supra, and Bergen and Williams, in
the Final Report, note 47 supra.
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cludible therein only by reason of sections 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039,
2040, 2041 and 2042 (2).
There is considerable objection to the H.R. 9662 alternate proposal
for estates of 100,000 dollars or less because of the traditionally difficult
valuation problem which could invalidate the income tax returns of the
executor and the beneficiaries. There is also objection to the definition
of close corporation stock for this purpose. On the other hand, exclusion
from the conduit system of sections 661 and 662 for estate distributions of
real property in those states where it is a part of the probate estate,
tangible personal property other than money and close corporation stock
plus amounts distributed in satisfaction of a widow's family allowance
for support would go far to alleviate the present unfortunate traps for the
unwary in estate distributions. There is no doubt that it would constitute
a substantial improvement over the existing law concerning estate distri-
butions, and it would relieve the professional fiduciary from some of the
pressures of planning the tax consequences of estate distributions.
D. A Distribution in Kind Approach
At the request of Chairman Mills of the Ways and Means Committee
the Advisory Group presented for consideration, but without recom-
mendation, a distribution-in-kind approach to the taxation of estate in-
come.49 This proposal would exclude from the conduit system of sections
661 and 662, for a period of thirty-six months after the decedent's death,
the distribution by an executor or administrator of property other than
money owned by the decedent at the time of his death, or property the
basis of which is determined by the property so owned. The distributions-
in-kind approach would certainly broaden for decedents' estates the exclu-
sions from the conduit system of Subchapter J as compared to the present
section 663, and it would seem to be relatively easy to apply in the large
number of estates which do not contemplate the sale and reinvestment of
estate assets during the executorial period. Corpus cash is of course an
important need for the fiduciary for the payment of claims, expenses and
taxes, and there are many times when the beneficiaries are in need of a
distribution of corpus cash during the executorial period. If the distribu-
tion of corpus cash is to have income tax conduit consequences to the
beneficiaries, the distribution-in-kind approach may complicate somewhat
the decisions of the executor in regard to the retention or sale of estate
assets."0
49. Final Report of Advisory Group on Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, at 80 (1958). See also Casner, Income Tax Results of Interim Estate Distribu-
tionts to Beneficiaries, 98 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 200, 202 (1959).
50. Casner, note 49 supra.
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It is interesting to note that in 1959 a spokesman for the Treasury
Department said in response to the majority proposal of the Advisory
Group:
We do not agree, however, to the revision suggested by the
Advisory Group. Its proposal is that all items payable from
corpus of an estate during the thirty-six months following the
death of the decedent be exempt from tax in the hands of the dis-
tributees. We . . . recommend . . . a 'distribution in kind'
approach. . . . Under this approach, a distribution in property
(other than money) owned by the decedent at the time of his
death would be considered to be a payment from corpus of the
estate, and thus would not be considered a distribution of in-
come.
5 3
CONCLUSION
There is a widespread, general consensus that the 1954 conduit sys-
tem for taxing the income of estates and trusts produces serious inequities
in the treatment of corpus distributions by decedents' estates. Our basic
policy values seem to be quite clear and agreed to: in the context of de-
cedents' estates we want to exclude gifts (and distributions) of corpus
from gross income, but we want to tax gifts (and distributions) which
can only be paid from income. The problem seems to come down to
choosing the best mechanism for implementing this policy decision. *
There is a general consensus that the separate share rule should be
extended to decedents' estates and that the installment payments of spe-
cific gifts should not be limited to a specific number of installments, but
rather should be restricted to a specified number of taxable years in which
the installment distributions are taxfree.
Three of the four proposals, the Advisory Group Report, the Distri-
bution-in-Ind proposal favored by the Treasury Department in an earlier
year, and the H.R. 9662 proposal, would improve the income taxation of
estate distributions by broadening the exclusions of section 663 to the
conduit rules of sections 661 and 662. Under all three proposals, how-
ever, the conduit rules of Subchapter J and its key concept of distribut-
able net income will continue to apply for the purpose of determining the
income tax liability of both the estate and its beneficiaries with respect to
what is in fact taxable probate income. The differences between them
have to do only with the scope of the exclusions from the system during
51. Statement of Mr. David A. Lindsay, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
as reported in Stevens, Drastic Changes in Trust Tax Rules Likely: Treasury
Opposes Some, 10 or TAX 370, 372 (1959).
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the period of three years following the death of the decedent. The fourth
proposal, the entity rule, would take the income taxation of decedents'
estates completely out of Subchapter J for the three year period. This ap-
proach is based upon the argument that simplicity of computation is a
more important value in the income taxation of decedents' estates, and
this is particularly true with respect to smaller estates.
While the Advisory Group proposal is the broadest of the three, it
should be noted that the Distribution-in-Kind proposal is almost as broad,
the difference being mostly with respect to distributions of corpus cash,
and that both of these are substantially broader than the H.R. 9662 pro-
posal. The latter proposal is subject to criticism with respect to (1) its
technical requirements concerning close corporation stock, and (2) the
use of a 100,000 dollar valuation as a condition for its approval
of the Advisory Group proposal. It would seem that H.R. 9662 would
have done better if it had expressed the condition in terms of estates with
a gross income not in excess of a designated number of dollars rather than
a valuation of the gross estate.
The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association adopted a
proposal in 1963 which is substantially a copy of the recommendation of
the Advisory Group Report with respect to estate distributions. As be-
tween the Advisory Group Report and the Distribution-in-Kind approach,
while either would be a substantial improvement over the present inclu-
sion of corpus distributions in the income tax conduit system, the former
seems to provide a lesser problem in fiduciary management because it is
based upon the traditional practice of probate accounting. There would
not seem to be a significant loss of revenue in preferring the Advisory
Group Report over the Distribution-in-Kind approach for the thirty-six
month period recommended. Accordingly, it seems now that the Advi-
sory Group Report is probably the most feasible of the four proposals
for tax reform for estates with a substantial amount of taxable income,
limited to the period actually required for probate administration. It is
possible that the Internal Revenue Service could be authorized to extend
this period upon application for estates involved in litigation, or in other
cases where the executor submitted convincing evidence that the adminis-
tration of the estate must necessarily be continued, to the extent that it
was shown that probate assets could not be distributed.
Lastly, it would seem that there could be a place indeed for the entity
rule with respect to smaller estates. As indicated, it seems that this can
be better handled on the basis of the gross income of the estate each year
rather than the valuation of the estate assets on a given date. The con-
cern of those responsible tax scholars who have advocated the entity rule
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has been to provide tax simplicity for the smaller estate. It would seem
quite practical to provide that estates with a gross income of some stated
amount, e.g., 6,000 dollars or less, could elect to file a 1040 return as an
individual and not bother with the chameleon-like concept of distributable
net income and the Subchapter J conduit system.
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